A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-way Access Pricing:
Two-Part Tariffs by Jeon, Doh-Shin - Universitat Pompeu Fabra & Hurkens, Sjaak - Institute for Economic Analysis
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org
 
 
 
Working Paper #07-11 
 
September 2007 
 
A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Effcient Two-way 
Access Pricing: Two-Part Tariffs 
 
Doh-Shin Jeon 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
 
 Sjaak Hurkens 
Institute for Economic Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-way
Access Pricing: Two-Part Tariffs ∗
Doh-Shin Jeon† Sjaak Hurkens‡
September 19, 2007
Abstract
We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for intercon-
nected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature,
we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to
network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both
networks. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access
pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under competition in linear prices, derived by
Jeon (2005), but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable
price equal to the marginal cost under the class of rules. Therefore, the regulator can
choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus,
network coverage or investment: in particular, we show that the regulator can achieve
static and dynamic efficiency at the same time.
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1 Introduction
Access pricing constitutes the core of the policy issues regarding interconnected networks.
More precisely, studying how access prices affect competition between networks and de-
termining the optimal access prices form the central questions of the seminal papers on
two-way network interconnection in Telecommunication Industry (Armstrong 1998, Laffont-
Rey-Tirole (LRT, hereafter), 1998a,b) and the papers that followed.1 Although the papers
vary in terms of the retail prices they consider (linear versus non-linear prices, with or with-
out network based price discrimination), the degree of customer heterogeneity and whether
or not they explicitly consider receivers’ surplus, all the papers have a common trait in that
they consider a fixed access price, which is either negotiated bilaterally between two networks
or is fixed by a regulatory agency. In this paper, we make a departure from this standard
approach and consider what we call a retail benchmarking approach. In our approach, we
study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j
as a (linear) function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. Using
this approach, Jeon (2005) considers the case of competition in linear prices and derives the
optimal access pricing rule that implements the Ramsey outcome. In this paper, we consider
the case of competition in two-part tariffs and study an adaptation of the optimal rule dis-
covered in Jeon (2005). It turns out that the adapted rule has some remarkable properties
that we explain below.
In the case of competition in linear prices, Jeon (2005) considers a set of linear access
pricing rules that includes any fixed access price and the well-known Efficient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR) as particular rules. He shows that within this set, there is a unique
rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the
underlying demand conditions, as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability
between networks’ services. This optimal rule is such that the mark-up of the access price
that network i pays to network j is equal to the mark-up of network i’s retail price multiplied
by n/(n − 1) where n represents the number of competing networks. This rule promotes
competition in retail prices as network i can decrease its access payment by reducing its
retail price. Since access pricing rules are much more general than fixed access prices, it is
perhaps not that surprising that some rule is able to implement the Ramsey outcome. What
is a very remarkable feature of the optimal access pricing rule is that it does not depend on
1See, for instances, Carter and Wright (1999, 2003), Dessein (2003, 2004), Gans and King (2000,
2001), Hahn (2004), Hermalin and Katz (2001, 2004), Jeon-Laffont-Tirole (2004), Laffont-Marcus-Rey-Tirole
(2003), Valletti and Cambini (2005) and Wright (2002).
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the demand structure2 so that the regulator only needs to observe marginal costs and retail
prices and does not need to know anything about the demand side.3 Furthermore, the model
and access pricing rules allow for more than two competing networks.4
This paper considers the case of competition in two-part tariffs. We adapt the access
pricing rule that is optimal in the case of linear prices such that the mark-up of the access
price above the termination cost that network i pays to network j is equal to network i’s
average retail price mark-up multiplied by a factor κ.5 We show that under the adapted
rules each network finds it optimal to charge its variable price equal to the true marginal
cost for any market share and for any κ ≤ 1: in fact, when κ = 0, the access price is equal
to the termination cost and LRT (1998a) show that in this case, the variable price is equal
to the marginal cost. When κ = 0, network i’s profit is equal to its market share multiplied
by profit per customer (net of the fixed cost per customer). Therefore, maximizing network
i’s profit with respect to its variable price, while maintaining its market share constant, is
equivalent to maximizing its profit per customer, which leads to the marginal cost pricing.
When κ 6= 0, under our access rule, the access payment per customer that network i makes
to its rival networks is equal to a fraction (smaller than one) of its profit per customer (as
long as κ ≤ 1). Therefore, our rule generates the marginal cost pricing as long as κ = 0
does it. For instance, we show that our rule achieves the marginal cost pricing even when
networks face heterogeneous customers and compete with a menu of two-part tariffs.
Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can properly choose κ to pursue
another goal while achieving the efficient pricing in terms of variable price. For instance,
since the equilibrium profit decreases with κ (i.e., the profit neutrality result does not hold
within our framework), κ can be chosen to increase consumer surplus at the expense of firms’
2Under the LRT assumption of full coverage
3In contrast, under the standard approach of fixed access price (LRT,1998a), (i) the Ramsey access price
must be lower than the termination cost but no equilibrium exists if the access price is different from the
termination cost and the services provided by different networks are substitutable enough; (ii) if access prices
are determined through private negotiations, networks can achieve the monopoly outcome by coordinating
on a certain level of access price; (iii) the Ramsey access price is informationally demanding since it requires
the regulator to possess precise information regarding both the cost and the demand structure.
4Stennek and Tanger˚as (2006) also consider a model that allows for more than two networks. Their
analysis accounts for the fact that the bilaterally agreed upon reciprocal access price between two networks
affects their competitiveness with respect to other rivals. Since network based price discrimination is not
allowed for in the model, the equilibrium retail price set by one particular network will be influenced by all
negotiated access prices. It is shown that, in the absence of regulation, this competition in access prices
has no effect and networks will be able to sustain monopoly retail prices. However, a light-handed form a
regulation (setting a maximum access price) induces networks to set retail prices close to marginal cost when
networks are sufficiently close substitutes.
5It turns out that the rule that implements the Ramsey outcome in case of linear prices gives firms
incentives to set variable price below cost and high fixed fees, generating a high volume of (off-net) calls for
which negative access charges would have to be paid.
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profits. This also suggests that κ can be chosen to promote penetration in markets where
no full coverage equilibrium exists with fixed access charges. Very interestingly, κ can also
be chosen to increase firms’ profits so as to create incentives for socially optimal investment
in network quality (i.e., to achieve static and dynamic efficiency at the same time).
Making access prices depend on retail prices is an old idea in the case of one-way access.
The well-known ECPR6 achieves the efficient entry by equalizing the access price that an
entrant should pay to the incumbent with the sum of the cost of providing the access and the
latter’s opportunity cost (i.e., the incumbent’s retail price mark-up) when the incumbent’s
retail price is regulated. However, the ECPR is not good at promoting competition in retail
prices when the retail prices are not regulated since the access price that the incumbent
receives increases with its retail price.7 This motivated Sibley et al. (2004) to consider the
Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (GECPR) in which the access price that an
entrant pays is, roughly speaking, equal to the sum of the cost of providing the access and
the entrant’s opportunity cost (i.e., the entrant’s retail price mark-up). They find that since
the entrant can reduce its access charge payment by lowering its retail price, the GECPR is
good at intensifying retail competition.
In the case of two-way access, LRT (1998a) examine various interpretations of the ECPR
in a duopoly framework and show that when networks can privately negotiate on a fixed
level of access price, the ECPR allows them to collude and achieve the monopoly outcome.
More importantly, Mialon (2007) studies the GECPR, considered by Sibley et al. (2004) in
one-way access, in LRT’s framework of duopoly with linear pricing.8 Under the GECPR,
the mark-up of the access price that network i pays to the rival network is equal to the
former’s retail price mark-up. Jeon (2005) shows that there exists a unique rule achieving
the Ramsey outcome in the set of linear access pricing rules which includes the GECPR as
a special case. Since the optimal rule is different from the GECPR, the GECPR does not
achieve the Ramsey outcome.9
In practice, there are cases in which access prices (or termination charges) depend on
6See Baumol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994) and Willig (1979). For an introduction to the ECPR, see
Armstrong (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (2000).
7Moreover, as Economides and White (1995) point out, the ECPR avoids entry by less efficient entrants
and thus achieves productive efficiency, but this social gain may be more than outweighed by the loss in
consumer surplus by means of foregone competition and high retail prices.
8Doganoglu and Tauman (2002) also consider a linear access pricing rule which depends on retail price.
More precisely, in their paper, the access price that network i receives from network j is a (positive and)
constant fraction of the linear retail price that network i charges. This rule is included as a special case in
the set of the access pricing rules that we consider. As is explained in section 3, this kind of rule cannot be
optimal since network i has an incentive to increase (rather than reduce) its retail price in order to receive
a higher access payment.
9In fact, the equilibrium price under the GECPR is higher than the Ramsey price.
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retail tariffs. In the context of termination charges for mobile phone service, the Australian
competition and consumer commission (2001) adopted what they call “retail benchmarking
approach” (the title of our paper comes from this report), which means that “access prices
for GSM termination will fall at the same rate as retail prices for mobile services provided by
a mobile carrier (p.89).” Some other countries use a “retail-minus” approach to set access
prices on the basis of a fixed discount off the corresponding retail prices. (See OECD, 2004.)
10
Our result in Section 6 that there is a class of access pricing rules which achieve ef-
ficiency when networks face heterogeneous consumers and compete in menus of two-part
tariffs is interesting in its own right. Previously, Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) find that
when the access price is equal to the termination cost (i.e., κ = 0), network competition
achieves efficiency. However, in this case, access price disappears from the profit function
and the profit function becomes the same as the one in a standard Hotelling model without
interconnection. This is why they rediscover the efficient two-part tariff result obtained by
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in the context of competitive
price discrimination without interconnection. In other words, in Dessein (2003) and Hahn
(2004), efficiency is achieved by making the case with interconnection similar to the case
without interconnection. What we show is that in the presence of interconnection, there is
a class of access pricing rules which achieve efficiency; interconnection provides additional
instruments to achieve efficiency with respect to no interconnection.
Section 2 presents the general model, defines the set of linear access pricing rules and
characterizes the Ramsey outcome. Section 3 briefly reviews the results in the case of
competition in linear prices obtained by Jeon (2005). Section 4 considers how the optimal
rule in section 3 can be adapted in a context where firms compete in non-linear prices
by benchmarking the access price to the average retail price. It shows that a whole class
of benchmarking rules lead to marginal cost pricing. Section 5 shows that by choosing
adequately among these rules the regulator can pursue another goal. In particular, section
5.2 shows that the regulator can achieve both static and dynamic efficiency at the same time.
Section 6 considers the case of heterogeneous consumers in which firms compete with menu
of two-part tariffs and shows that the main result derived in section 4 is robust. Section 7
concludes.
10Another example of pegging access price to retail tariffs can be found in the international postal service.
For instance, access prices (i.e., what they call “termination dues”) among European countries should be
set at 80% of domestic tariffs (Ghosal, 2002).
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2 Framework
2.1 The model
We present a general model of n-network competition which includes the duopoly model of
LRT (1998a) as a special case. There is a mass one of consumers.
• Individual demand :
Let u(q) be the utility that a consumer derives from placing q volume of calls. The utility
function u(·) is twice continuously differentiable, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, which implies that
demand function is differentiable. Let q(·) denote the demand function, given by u′(q(p)) = p
where p is the variable retail price. When network i charges pi, the volume of calls placed
by a customer of network i is given by q(pi). Let v(p) be the indirect utility function, i.e.,
v(p) = max
q
{u(q)− pq)}.
Let R(p) ≡ (p − c)q(p) represent the revenue per consumer. We assume that R(p) has a
unique maximum at p = pm, is strictly increasing when p < pm and strictly decreasing when
p > pm. Therefore, pm denotes the monopoly price. Let Rm denote the monopoly revenue
per consumer (i.e., Rm = R(pm)). We assume limp→∞R(p) = 0.
• Firm’s demand (or market share):
The networks (i.e., firms) provide horizontally differentiated services and each network
can cover all the consumers. Under competition in two-part tariffs, firm i chooses tariff
Ti = Fi + piq. Given (pi, Fi), the net surplus of a consumer of network i is given by:
wi = v(pi)− Fi.
Let w ≡ (w1, ...wn) and w−i ≡ (w1, .., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wn). Let αi(wi;w−i) denote the mea-
sure of consumers subscribing to network i. We assume that αi(w) satisfies the following
properties:
Property 1 (symmetry): For any vector w with wi = wj for some i and j, we have
αi(w) = αj(w).
Property 2 (monotonicity): For any i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, αi(wi;w−i) is differ-
entiable with respect to each wj and increases with wi and decreases with wj; it strictly
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increases with wi and strictly decreases with wj for αi ∈ (0, 1).11
Property 3 (full coverage):
∑n
i=1 αi(wi;w−i) = 1 for all relevant w ∈ <n+.
Properties 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied by the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a) and the
circular city model with n = 2 or 3 (Salop, 1979). For n > 3, our model is more natural
than the circular city model since in the latter, a (minor) price change of network i affects
only the demands of its direct neighbors (network i − 1 and network i + 1) but does not
affect the demands of other networks. In the context of telecommunication markets all
networks compete directly with each other for all customers, and not only with two artificial
”neighbors” for a specific subset of consumers. The symmetry and the full coverage imply
αi =
1
n
for all i = 1, ..., n if wi = w for all i = 1, ..., n. Regarding the full coverage property,
LRT (1998a) assume that each consumer derives, in addition to u(q), a constant utility v0
from subscribing to one of the networks, which is large enough to ensure that all consumers
always choose to join one of the networks. Since the total mass of consumers is equal to
one, under full coverage, the mass of consumers subscribing to network i (i.e., αi) is equal
to network i’s market share.
In the case of competition in linear prices, let p ≡ (p1, ..., pn) ∈ <n+ represent the vector
of retail prices and let p−i ≡ (p1, .., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pn). Since wi strictly decreases with pi, it
is more convenient to work with αi(pi;p−i) than with αi(wi;w−i). Obviously, properties 1-3
imply that similar properties hold for αi(pi;p−i). Of course, αi(pi;p−i) decreases with pi
and increases with pj.
• Cost :
Concerning the cost side, we use the same technology that is used in LRT (1998a).
Serving a customer involves a fixed cost f > 0, say of connecting the customer’s home to
the network and of billing and serving her. We assume Rm > f . A network also incurs a
marginal cost c0 per call at the originating and terminating ends of the call and marginal
cost c1 in between. Therefore, the total marginal cost of a call is
c ≡ 2c0 + c1.
11Property 2 can be more rigorously defined as follows. Given w−i, let wi be the minimum wi making
αi(wi;w−i) = 1 and let wi be the maximum wi ∈ <+ making αi(wi;w−i) = 0. Then, αi strictly increases
with wi for wi ∈ [wi, wi]. Similarly, given w−j with j 6= i, let wj be the minimum wj ∈ <+ making
αi(wi;w−i) = 0 and let wj be the maximum wj ∈ <+ making αi(wi;w−i) = 1. Then, αi strictly decreases
with wj for wj ∈
[
wj , wj
]
.
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2.2 Access pricing rules
We consider simple access pricing rules which are not informationally demanding. More
precisely, the informational constraint that the regulator faces is defined as follows.
• The regulator’s informational constraint :
On the one hand, we assume that the regulator (or the competition authority) has limited
information about the market such that she is not informed about the individual demand
function q(p), each firm’s demand function and the value of the fixed cost f . On the other
hand, she knows the marginal cost c and the termination cost c0. Furthermore, she and
consumers observe retail prices (p1, F1), ..., (pn, Fn). Moreover, the regulator can observe
average retail prices,12 which means that she must be able to observe realized demand.
The firms are assumed to know all the relevant information regarding both the demand
and the cost sides.
• The linear access pricing rules :
Let aij with i 6= j denote the access charge that network i pays to network j. In Jeon
(2005) which considers competition in linear prices, in order to consider simple rules, he
limits attention to the following linear access pricing rules:
aij − c0 = h(pi, pj, c) = h1pi + h2pj + h3c+ h4 for any i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, (1)
where (h1, h2, h3, h4) ∈ <4 is a vector of constants. Note that the rule is reciprocal since
the coefficients (h1, h2, h3, h4) do not depend on firms’ identities. This is without loss of
generality given that networks are symmetric.13 Let ΛLn be the set of linear access pricing
rules satisfying the above form (1). Some special cases of linear access pricing rules are:
• Cost based access pricing rule: aij = c0.
• Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR): aij − c0 = pj − c.
• Generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR): aij − c0 = pi − c.
• Bill and keep: aij = 0.
12For instance, the Spanish telecommunication agency (Comisio´n del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones)
publishes data on each network’s average price.
13In the case of asymmetric networks, we need to consider non-reciprocal rules such that the coefficients
depend on the firms’ identities. See Carter and Wright (2003) for the study of asymmetric networks.
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In the case of the ECPR, the access price that network i pays to network j is the sum
of the termination cost and network j’s retail price mark-up. In contrast, in the case of the
GECPR, the access price that network i pays to network j is the sum of the termination
cost and network i’s retail price mark-up (Sibley et al. 2004, Mialon 2007).
2.3 Ramsey benchmark
For future reference, we derive the social optimum in the ideal case in which the regulator
knows all the relevant information and can dictate the prices under the constraint that the
industry breaks even. Under linear pricing, consumer variable welfare is
W (p) =
n∑
i=1
αi(p)v(pi)− T [α1(p), ..., αn(p)] (2)
where T (α1, ..., αn) denotes the average consumer’s utility from not being able to consume
her preferred service. We assume that T (α) is minimized at equal market share αi =
1
n
. The
industry budget constraint is
n∑
i=1
αi(p)R(pi) = f. (3)
Maximizing (2) subject to (3) yields a symmetric solution, pi = p
R for all i = 1, ..., n,
where the Ramsey price pR is the lowest price that satisfies the budget constraint:
R(pR) = f.
Since we assume Rm > f , we have pR < pm. Let q(pR) ≡ qR.
Clearly, in the case of competition in two-part tariffs, it is socially optimal to set a two-
part tariff with variable price c and fixed fee F ≥ f . T (α) is minimized at equal market
share αi =
1
n
.
2.4 Timing
The timing of the game we consider is the following:
1. The regulator chooses a linear access pricing rule in ΛLn .
2. All networks simultaneously choose retail prices.
3. Consumers make subscription and consumption decisions.
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3 Summary of the Results under Competition in Lin-
ear Prices
In this section, we summarize the results in the case of competition in linear prices in Jeon
(2005). This is because the rules we consider in the case of competition in two-part tariff is
derived from the optimal rule in the case of competition in linear prices.
Under competition in linear prices, two more properties are assumed. Property 4 is
about the degree of substitutability among the networks. Because of our assumptions on
R(p), there exists a p > pm such that R(p) = f . We assume in this section:
Property 4 (substitutability): αi(p) = 0 if pi ≥ p¯ and pj = pm for some j 6= i.
The property says that a firm charging a high price yielding negative revenue per costumer
will have no market share if there is at least one competitor charging no more than the
monopoly price. Hence the property guarantees that there is at least some mild level of
substitutability.
Property 5 is a technical assumption to eliminate asymmetric equilibria for n ≥ 3:
Property 5 (proportional market share increases): Let i, j and k be three different
firms and consider price vectors p and pˆ with pk < pˆk and pm = pˆm for all m 6= k. If
αj(p) > 0, then αi(pˆ)/αj(pˆ) = αi(p)/αj(p).
Property 5 says that the ratio of market shares of any two firms is not affected by a
price increase by a third firm. It is automatically satisfied when n = 2 and is introduced to
exclude asymmetric equilibria when n ≥ 3.
The following proposition shows the main result for the case of competition in linear
prices.
Proposition 1 (Competition in linear prices, Jeon, 2005) For any demand structure satis-
fying Properties 1-5 and for n ≥ 2, there is a unique linear access pricing rule in ΛLn defined
by aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c) that implements, independently of the underlying demand condi-
tions, the Ramsey outcome (pi = p
R for all i = 1, ..., n) as the unique equilibrium, which is
symmetric.
Note the remarkable result that the optimal rule implementing the Ramsey outcome does
not depend on the demand structure as long as it satisfies Properties 1-5.
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The following corollary compares different access pricing rules in the case of n = 2.
Suppose that the regulator should choose an access pricing rule without knowing the demand
structure while she only knows the marginal cost structure (c, c0). Consider duopolistic
competition14 and, for simplicity, let ai denote the access charge that network i pays to the
rival network. Then, from Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Jeon, 2005) Under Properties 1-5, the social welfare is strictly higher under
the access pricing rule ai − c0 = 2(pi − c) than under any other fixed access price (including
ai = c0), under the ECPR (ai−c0 = pj−c, for i 6= j) and under the GECPR (ai−c0 = pi−c).
4 The main result
Although linear prices are used in practice, especially for pre-paid cards in the mobile
telecommunication market, we cannot deny that non-linear prices are also heavily used.
Moreover, the literature has embraced two-part tariff competition as the standard. In this
section we study competition in two-part tariffs when our rule is adapted to make access
charges depend (linearly) on average retail prices. We show in this section that the class of
rules we consider induces networks to choose the marginal cost pricing in a general setting.
It is clear that firms would prefer to use two-part tariffs rather than linear prices. Namely,
when firms are allowed to use a two-part tariff, they will in general find it optimal to set a
strictly positive fixed fee to extract consumer surplus. If one would naively use the access
pricing rule that is optimal in the case of linear prices (i.e., aij = c0+2(pi− c)) when firm i
uses tariff Ti = Fi + piq, no symmetric equilibrium would exist.
15 Therefore, the rule needs
to be adapted to give sensible and satisfactory results. Inspired by the previous discussion,
we propose to make the access charge to be paid by firm i to depend linearly on its average
retail price as follows:
ai = c0 + κ
(
Fi + piq(pi)
q(pi)
− c
)
, (4)
where ai represents the access charge that firm i pays to each rival firm. Since it only depends
on firm i’s retail prices, we use ai instead of aij for simplicity.
14The intuition obtained in this section applies to the case of n > 2 as well.
15More precisely, firms would have incentives to reduce variable price below cost (for example, to zero if
negative prices are not allowed) so that access charge becomes negative. Each network would then receive
money from its rival for each off-net call made by its subscribers. This then leads the firms to compete for
market share by reducing fixed fees resulting in huge losses.
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Under the standard full coverage assumption, we find that firms always will set variable
price equal to marginal cost c, independently of κ and their market shares, for all κ ≤ 1.
In what follows, we first explain intuitively why the class of access pricing rules we consider
generates the marginal cost pricing.
Given (pi, Fi), the net surplus of a consumer of network i is given by:
wi = v(pi)− Fi.
Let w ≡ (w1, ...wn). The market share of network i is given by αi(w). For instance, in the
Hotelling model of duopoly (LRT, 1998a,b), we have
αi =
1
2
+ σ(wi − wj),
where σ ≡ 1/(2t) and t is the transportation cost in the Hotelling model. We first consider
the case of κ = 0 which corresponds to ai = c0. Then, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi [(pi − c)q(pi) + Fi − f ] = αipii − αif.
where pii ≡ (pi − c)q(pi) + Fi represents network i’s retail profit per customer gross of the
fixed cost f when κ = 0. It is useful to think that network i chooses (pi, wi) instead of
(pi, Fi). Then, we have:
Πi(pi, wi) = αi [(pi − c)q(pi) + v(pi)− wi − f ]
= αi [u(q(pi))− cq(pi)− wi − f ] .
Given wi (hence, given αi), maximizing Πi with respect to pi is equivalent to maximizing
total surplus, which leads to the marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi = c) for any αi as LRT (1998a)
show.
Consider now κ 6= 0. Then, we have the following expression for network i’s profit:
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi [(pi − c− (1− αi))(ai − c0)q(pi) + Fi − f + Σj 6=iαj(aj − c0)q(pj)] .
In particular, from (4) the total access payment mark-up that network i makes to network
j is given by:
αi(1− αi)(ai − c0)q(pi) = αiκ(1− αi)pii.
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The above equation shows that network i’s access payment mark-up per customer is a fraction
(1 − αi)κ of its retail profit per customer pii. Inserting the above expression into the profit
function leads to
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi [(1− κ(1− αi))pii − f + κΣj 6=iαjpij] , (5)
which is equivalent to
Πi(pi, wi) = αi [(1− κ(1− αi))(R(pi) + v(pi)− wi)]− αif + αiκΣj 6=iαjpij (6)
Therefore, as long as (1 − κ(1 − αi)) ≥ 0 (which is satisfied when κ ≤ 1), the profit max-
imization with respect to pi for given wi leads to the marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi = c)
for any αi and for any κ ≤ 1. The intuition is clear from (6). Given wi (hence, given αi),
when we maximize Πi with respect to pi, only the first term matters in (6) and therefore
maximizing Πi is equivalent to maximizing the profit per customer pii as is the case when
κ = 0. This is because, under our access pricing rule, network i’s access payment mark-up
per customer is just a fraction of its retail profit per customer.
The above intuition suggests that our access pricing rule gives the marginal cost pricing
under various circumstances; as long as aj = c0 generates the marginal cost pricing, our
access pricing rule generates the marginal cost pricing as well. In fact, we show this later
on when firms can invest to improve quality of their networks or when firms compete by
providing a menu of two-part tariffs to heterogeneous customers.
The following proposition presents our main result:
Proposition 3 Assume Properties 1-3. (i) For any n ≥ 2 and κ ≤ 1, all networks choose
the same variable price p = c.
(ii) More specifically, in the case of the Hotelling duopoly model (LRT, 1998a,b), when
κ ≤ 1 and for small enough σ > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric.
In the equilibrium, networks charge variable price p = c and fixed fee F = f + (2− κ)/(4σ).
Equilibrium profits per firm equal (2− κ)/(8σ).
Hence, for any κ ≤ 1 we obtain efficient pricing. By varying κ we can address and achieve
further objectives, without distorting the efficient marginal cost pricing result. Furthermore,
proposition 3(ii) shows that the profit is not neutral and decreases with κ. An increase in κ
promotes competition in terms of the fixed fee and thereby decreases the profit. Therefore,
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by increasing κ, the regulator or competition authority can improve consumer welfare at the
expense of firms’ profits.
However, we cannot push firms’ profits all the way to zero. Namely, this would require
firms to set the competitive schedule T = f + cq, which in turn requires setting κ = 2. But
this cannot be an equilibrium since the average price at this equilibrium is strictly above c,
so that access charge is above marginal cost. A network could deviate by offering a schedule
T˜ = F˜ + p˜q, where 0 < p˜ < c and F˜ = −(p˜ − c)q(p˜), such that its average price is exactly
equal to marginal cost c and such that its market share α˜i is positive but less than one half.
The deviating firm then pays an access fee equal to termination cost c0 so that both on-net
and off-net calls are at marginal cost c, which in turn equals average price. It thus would earn
zero net profits from calls made by her own subscribers but would then make strictly positive
profits because the net access revenue exceeds the incurred fixed costs: 2(1− α˜i)α˜if > α˜if .
Proof.
Since (i) is proven in the text before the proposition, we only need to prove (ii). We first
derive the unique symmetric equilibrium candidate. We will then derive conditions under
which this candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
Using v′(pi) = −q(pi) we obtain
∂Πi/∂pi = αiq
′(pi)(pi − c)(1− κ(1− αi)). (7)
When 1 − κ(1 − αi) > 0 and αi > 0, this derivative is negative (positive) when pi > c
(pi < c, respectively). Hence, the equilibrium price in a symmetric equilibrium must be
equal to marginal cost c.
We now focus on the derivative of profit with respect to wi.
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ
[
Πi
αi
]
+ αi(−1 + κ(1− αi) + κσ[Fi +R(pi)− Fj −R(pj)]). (8)
In a symmetric interior equilibrium we have pi = c and thus Πi = (F − f)/2. Hence, the
first order condition gives
0 = σ(Fi − f) + 1
2
(−1 + κ/2).
The symmetric equilibrium candidate has thus
F = f +
2− κ
4σ
.
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Symmetric equilibrium profit per firm equals
Π∗ =
2− κ
8σ
.
We see that a necessary condition is κ ≤ 2. The second order derivative yields
∂2Πi
∂w2i
= 2σ[−1 + κσ(R(pi) + v(pi)− 3wi −R(pj)− v(pj) + 3wj)].
At the symmetric equilibrium candidate this is equal to −2σ and thus strictly negative for
all κ.
We now derive sufficient and necessary conditions for the symmetric equilibrium candi-
date T = F + cq to be indeed an equilibrium.
Hence, let p2 = c and F2 = F . That is, w2 = v(c)− F = v(c)− f + (κ− 2)/(4σ). First,
we know from (7) that, as long as 1− κ(1− α1) > 0, it is optimal to set p1 = c. This is the
case when κ ≤ 1 and αi > 0. The optimal w1 is then found by the first order condition at
w1 = w2, since the second order derivative (2σ(−1 + 3κσ(w2 − w1))) is strictly negative for
all w1 ≥ 0 as long as σ is small enough.
On the other hand, if κ > 1, network 1 can obtain unbounded profits by choosing w1
such that 1 − κ(1 − α1) < 0 by letting p1 ≈ 0. (Namely, if demand is as in LRT, then
limp1→0 v(p1) +R(p1) = −∞, and profit is unbounded from equation (6)).
It is not hard to see that there cannot be an asymmetric equilibrium. Namely, from (7)
we know that both firms will set pj = c. Substituting these prices and taking derivatives
with respect to wi yields
∂Πi
∂wi
= σv(c)− wi − σf + σκ(1− 2αi)(wi − wj)− αi(1− κ(1− αi)).
Subtracting the first order derivative for firm j from that for firm i yields
0− 0 = ∂Πi
∂wi
− ∂Πj
∂wj
= −3σ(wi − wj),
so that wi = wj.
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5 Pursuing additional goals
In this section, we consider the Hotelling model a` la LRT (1998a). We show how the degree
of freedom in the class of access pricing rules that achieve static efficiency can be used to
pursue an additional goal.
5.1 Expanding coverage
In this subsection we take the participation condition of consumers seriously. In the previous
section, and in most of the related literature, one typically assumes that σ is small enough,
which implies that transportation cost t is very large. This would lead consumers in the
center of the Hotelling model to forego subscribing to a network. In order to maintain the
full coverage assumption one needs to assume that consumers have a high enough valuation
for being subscribed to the network, even if no one else subscribes or when hardly any calls
are made (typically, v0, introduced in section 2, is assumed to be large enough). A reason
for this could be that then one can call 911 in emergencies. In this subsection, we relax
this assumption and assume that v0 is not large and smaller than f . Hence, the number of
subscribers in equilibrium will depend on the net surplus consumers obtain, which in turn
depends on the degree of competition between two networks.
Assume that consumers’ valuation from subscribing to a network when in total ρ con-
sumers are subscribing to one of the networks is such that a consumer at distance x from
his network that charges T = F + pq, receives utility v0 + ρv(p)− F − xt.
Let us denote
λ =
v0 + v(c)− f
t
.
When total coverage by two networks charging T = f + cq equals 2α ≤ 1, social welfare
equals
W (α) = 2α(v0 + 2αv(c)− f − tα/2).
W ′(α) = 2(α(4v(c)− t) + v0 − f) and W ′′(α) = 2(4v(c)− t). If t ≥ 4v(c), W ′(α) < 0 for all
positive α and consumer welfare is maximized at α = 0. If t < 4v(c), W (α) is convex and
maximized at zero or 1/2. Since W (0) = 0 and W (1/2) = v0 + v(c)− f − t/4, we find that
the full coverage is optimal when λ > 1/4 and that no coverage is optimal when λ ≤ 1/4.
However, also note that when networks charge the very competitive schedule T = f + cq,
the consumer in the middle only receives positive net surplus if v0 + v(c) − f − t/2 > 0.
Hence, implementing the consumer surplus maximizing network prices when λ ∈ (1/4, 1/2)
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is incompatible with voluntary participation. We will henceforth assume that λ > 1/2 so
that full coverage is both feasible and desirable.
We now consider the necessary condition for a full coverage equilibrium to exist. Recall
from Proposition 3 that equilibrium prices are T = f + t− κt/2 + cq. To have full coverage
and voluntary participation in such an equilibrium, one needs the consumer in the center of
the interval to be willing to subscribe when anticipating that everyone will subscribe to one
of the networks. This condition reads v0 + v(c)− t/2− (f + t− κt/2) > 0, or equivalently,
λ =
v0 + v(c)− f
t
>
3− κ
2
.
In particular, for κ = 0 there is no equilibrium in which the market is fully covered when
(v0+v(c)−f)/t < 3/2. By increasing κ one relaxes the full coverage constraint. In particular,
as long as λ ∈ (1/2, 1), no full coverage equilibrium exists when subscription is voluntary
and cost based access price regulation (κ = 0) is applied. However, when using our rule with
κ = 1, existence of the full coverage equilibrium is restored when consumers anticipate that
the market will be covered. An increase in κ intensifies competition between the networks
and thereby make them leave a larger surplus to consumers, which make the full coverage
more likely. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), assume v0 < f . Then, an increase
in κ makes full coverage more likely. For λ ∈ (1/2, 1) where λ ≡ [v0 + v(c)− f ] /t, no full
coverage equilibrium exists under the cost based access price regulation ( i.e., when κ = 0)
but existence of the full coverage equilibrium is restored when κ = 1.
5.2 Investment
Valletti and Cambini (2005) analyze the effects of fixed access fees on firms’ incentives to
invest in the quality of their network. They find that the profit neutrality result breaks
down when quality of networks is determined endogenously. If access charge is fixed at or
above marginal cost of termination, firms underinvest in quality in order to avoid running
an access deficit, since the network with the highest quality will have more calls going out
to the other network than calls coming in from the other network.
Valletti and Cambini (2005) also find that if firms can freely negotiate reciprocal access
charges they will set it above marginal cost which would imply even lower investment levels
and inefficiently high usage fees. To induce efficient investment levels one needs to set access
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charges below marginal cost of termination. In order to calculate this optimal access fee
the regulator needs information about demand. Moreover, when access fee is set in this
way, usage fee will be inefficiently low (below marginal cost). That is, to induce dynamic
efficiency one is forced to lose static efficiency.
In this subsection we adopt Valletti and Cambini’s (2005) framework of investment but
access charges are defined by our retail benchmarking rule (4). We show that for any κ ≤ 1
the rule induces firms to set usage fee equal to marginal cost. Moreover, by choosing κ
appropriately (below zero), one can induce socially efficient investment. Moreover, setting
the appropriate κ does not require knowledge of the demand function. Finally, it is shown
that firms may obtain higher net profits under this socially optimal rule than with any fixed
access fee.
Following Valletti and Cambini (2005) we assume that firms in a first stage invest in
quality ρi ≥ ρ¯ > 0, and that they afterwards compete in two-part tariffs Ti = Fi + piq. The
cost of investment is given by the convex function I(ρi). Each subscriber subscribes to exactly
one of both networks and a subscriber to network i makes ρiq(pi) calls and receives indirect
utility ρiv(pi). We first find the socially optimal investment in a symmetric equilibrium
ρi = ρj = ρ. Assume pi = pj = c, which is required by static efficiency. Then, the socially
optimal ρ is determined by maximizing ρv(c)− 2I(ρ), which gives v(c) = 2I ′(ρ).
Now we turn to the competition between the two networks. Since we will need to know
which two-part tariffs firms set when they are of different quality, we will not be able to
restrict attention at the pricing stage to symmetric equilibria. Given ρ1 and ρ2, gross profit
of network i (not including investment costs) is given by
Πi(p, w) = αi [(1− κ(1− αi))(ρiR(pi) + ρiv(pi)− wi − f) + κ(1− αi)(ρjR(pj) + ρjv(pj)− wj − f)] .
Thus
∂Πi
∂pi
= αi(1− κ(1− αi))ρi(pi − c)q′(pi)
and we obtain again the marginal cost pricing result, independently of κ, ρi and ρj.
Fixed fees will turn out to depend on networks’ qualities. Namely, given p1 = p2 = c, we
have
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ[(1− κ(1− αi))(ρiv(c)− wi − f) + κ(1− αi)(ρjv(c)− wj − f)]
+αi[−1 + κ(1− αi) + κσ[(ρi − ρj)v(c)− wi + wj]].
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The first order conditions can be solved explicitly to yield
wi =
−6 + 3κ+ 4σv(c)(2ρi + ρj) + 4κ(σv(c))2(ρi − ρj)2
12σ
− f
and
αi =
3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj)
6
. (9)
Net profits in the second stage are then given by
Πi(ρi, ρj) =
(3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj))2(6− κ(3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj)))
216σ
− I(ρi).
Taking first order derivatives and looking for a symmetric equilibrium in qualities yields
ρi = ρ where the latter solves
I ′(ρ) = v(c)(4− 3κ)/12.
Since I(·) is convex and v(c) is positive, it follows immediately that equilibrium investment is
decreasing in κ. Letting κ = 0 corresponds exactly to Valletti and Cambini’s (2005) case of
cost based access price regulation where firms invest at the inefficiently low level determined
by I ′(ρ) = v(c)/3. By setting κ = −2/3 one obtains 2I ′(ρ) = v(c), which corresponds to
the efficient level of investment. The negative factor κ means that access charges are below
marginal cost. The intuition for the result that κ should be set below zero is similar to the
one underlying the result of Valletti and Cambini (2005) that a fixed access price should
optimally set below the termination cost, but is even clearer. Namely, in our case marginal
prices in the second stage are always equal to marginal cost. Since consumers at the higher
quality network make more calls, the higher quality network will have more outgoing than
incoming calls (independently of the market shares), so that when access charge is above
marginal cost (that is, κ > 0), it will suffer from an access revenue deficit. This reduces
firms’ incentives to invest in the quality of their network in comparison with the situation
where access charge is equal to marginal cost (κ = 0). When access charge is below marginal
cost (that is, κ < 0), the effect is opposite and this increases firms’ incentives to invest.
An important difference with respect to Valletti and Cambini (2005) is that here we can
induce efficient investment without distorting efficient pricing, since for any κ ≤ 1, marginal
usage prices will be set to true marginal cost, independently of the qualities of the networks.
Under any fixed access charge a 6= c0, marginal usage price will be set equal to perceived
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marginal cost, which is not equal to true marginal cost, and is thus necessarily inefficient.
Moreover, it makes the computation of equilibria in the investment stage very cumbersome.
Indeed, Valletti and Cambini (2005) main results are about marginal deviations from cost
based access charges.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), suppose that networks invest in
quality (ρ1, ρ2) (≥ (ρ¯, ρ¯)) after the access pricing rule is determined and before they engage
in competition in two-part tariffs.
(i) For any (ρ1, ρ2) ≥ (ρ¯, ρ¯) and for any κ ≤ 1, each network chooses the variable price
equal to the marginal cost.
(ii) When κ = −2/3, each network has a socially efficient incentive to invest. In other
words, κ = −2/3 achieves both the static efficiency and the dynamic efficiency.
It is worthwhile to compare the profits of firms in the symmetric equilibrium under
our optimal benchmarking rule with κ = −2/3 with those under cost based access charges
(κ = 0). In the first case they are equal to 1/(3σ) − I(ρ∗) (where ρ∗ denotes the socially
efficient level of investment determined by I ′(ρ∗) = v(c)/2), while in the second case they
are equal to 1/(4σ) − I(ρ) (where ρ is determined by I ′(ρ) = v(c)/3). Depending on the
parameters, profits in the first case may be higher, despite the higher investments made.
For example, when I(ρ) = ρ2/2, v(p) = (10 − p)2/2, σ = 0.001, c0 = 1 and c = 2, and a
minimum level of investment is set at ρ¯ = 10. In this case the socially efficient investment
level equals ρ∗ = 16 and profit per firm equals 205.33. On the other hand, cost based access
charges (κ = 0) would lead to an investment level ρ = 10.67 and per firm profit of 193.
Finally, in case of bilateral negotiations about the reciprocal access charge, firms may be
able to agree on such high access charges that investment will be set at the minimum ρ¯ = 10.
In this case profits would be equal to 200. This illustrates that our socially optimal retail
benchmarking approach may provide higher profits for firms than any bilaterally agreed
upon fixed access charge.
6 Heterogeneous consumers and competition in menu
In this section, we consider the case of heterogeneous consumers as in Dessein (2003) and
Hahn (2004) and show that our main result obtained in section 4 is robust. There is a
fraction µ > 0 of light consumers and a fraction 1− µ > 0 of heavy consumers: let θ denote
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the type of a consumer with θ = H,L.16 From consuming q, a θ-type consumer obtains gross
utility uθ(q) in which
u′H(q) > u
′
L(q) > 0 and u
′′
θ(q) < 0 for θ = H,L.
Given a price p, let qθ(p) denote the volume of calls chosen by a consumer of type θ; we
have qH(p) > qL(p) for any p > 0. Network i offers a menu of two-part tariffs
{
F θi , p
θ
i
}
for
θ = H,L. For simplicity, qHi = q
H(pHi ) and q
L
i = q
L(pLi ). Let vθ(p) be the indirect utility
function of type θ.
wHi ≡ vH(pHi )− FHi , wLi ≡ vL(pLi )− FLi ;
αHi =
1
2
+ σ
(
wHi − wHj
)
, αLi =
1
2
+ σ
(
wLi − wLj
)
.
Let αi ≡ µαLi + (1− µ)αHi for i = 1, 2.
We consider again the access pricing rule in which the markup of the access price that
network i pays to the rival network is κ times its average price mark up:
ai − c0 = κ
(
µαLi
[
FLi + p
L
i q
L
i
]
+ (1− µ)αHi
[
FHi + p
H
i q
H
i
]
µαLi q
L
i + (1− µ)αHi qHi
− c
)
We will first consider the complete information case in which each consumer’s type is known
by both networks and networks can apply third degree price discrimination. We show that
in this case firms will offer exactly the same two-part tariffs to light and heavy users. This
then implies that the equilibrium under the complete information case is the equilibrium
under incomplete information.
Network i’s profit is given by:
Πi = µα
L
i
[
(pLi − c)qLi + FLi − f
]
+ (1− µ)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi + FHi − f
]
(10)
−(ai − c0)(µαLi qLi + (1− µ)αHi qHi )αj
+(aj − c0)
(
µαLj q
L
j + (1− µ)αHj qHj
)
αi.
16We consider the case with two types merely for expositional simplicity. Our result can be easily extended
to m types with m > 2.
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We have
(aj − c0)
(
µαLj q
L
j + (1− µ)αHj qHj
)
=
κ
{
µαLj
[
FLj + (p
L
j − c)qLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
FHj + (p
H
j − c)qHj
]}
.
Therefore,
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
(pLi − c)qLi + FLi
]
+ (1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi + FHi
]
−αif + αiκ
{
µαLj
[
FLj + (p
L
j − c)qLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
FHj + (p
H
j − c)qHj
]}
.
It is convenient to maximize Πi with respect to (p
θ
i , w
θ
i ) instead of (p
θ
i , F
θ
i ). Then, we have:
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
(pLi − c)qLi − vL(pLi ) + wLi
]
+(1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi − vH(pHi ) + wHi
]− αif
+αiκµα
L
j
[−vL(pLj ) + wLj + (pLj − c)qLj ]
+αiκ(1− µ)αHj
[−vH(pHj ) + wHj + (pHj − c)qHj ] .
Maximizing pii with respect to p
θ
i given w
θ
i leads to the marginal cost pricing for all α
θ
i as
long as κ ≤ 1. When pθi = pθj = c for θ = H,L, we have
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
vL(c)− wLi
]
+ (1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
vH(c)− wHi
]
−αif + αiκ
{
µαLj
[
vL(c)− wLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
vH(c)− wHj
]}
.
Taking derivatives and solving for a symmetric solution (i.e., wθi = w
θ
j for θ = L,H) yields
wθi = vθ − f +
κ− 2
4σ
,
so that
F θi = f +
2− κ
4σ
.
Since the optimal fixed fee is identical for both consumer types when firms can discriminate
between types, it will be optimal in the case of incomplete information to offer only one
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two-part tariff T = F + cq where
F =
2− κ
4σ
.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), suppose that consumers are het-
erogeneous (some are light consumers and others are heavy consumers) and that networks
compete in menus of two-part tariffs without knowing each consumer’s type.
(i) For any κ ≤ 1, each network chooses the variable price equal to the marginal cost for
all types of consumers.
(ii) Given κ ≤ 1, in symmetric equilibrium, both networks offer an identical two-part
tariff (p = c, F = 2−κ
4σ
) for all types of consumers.
Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) find that when a = c0 (i.e., κ = 0), both networks
offer an identical two-part tariff (p = c, F = 1
2σ
) for all types of consumers. In fact, if
a = c0, as can be seen in (10), access price disappears from the profit function and the profit
function becomes the same as the one in a standard Hotelling model without interconnection.
This is why they rediscover the efficient two-part tariff result obtained by Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in the context of competitive price discrimination
without interconnection between firms. In other words, a = c0 achieves efficiency by making
the case with interconnection similar to the case without interconnection. What we show is
that in the presence of interconnection, there is a class of access pricing rules which achieve
efficiency. Hence, interconnection provides extra instruments to achieve the static efficiency.
7 Conclusion
We studied a retail benchmarking approach to determine efficient access prices for inter-
connected networks when they compete in two-part tariffs. Our approach is simple since
we consider a set of access pricing rules that linearly links the mark-up of the access price
that network i pays to its rivals with network i’s retail price mark-up. Our approach is not
informationally demanding since the regulator only needs to know the marginal costs of com-
munication. We showed that the efficient access pricing rules that we found can significantly
improve social welfare with respect to what we can achieve with the standard approach of
fixed access prices.
More precisely, when networks compete in two-part tariffs, the literature has obtained a
static efficiency and a profit neutrality result. The static efficiency result says that setting
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access price equal to the termination cost leads to marginal cost pricing. The profit neutrality
result says that firms’ equilibrium profits are equal to the Hotelling profits for any access
price. These two results provide a rationale for letting firms choose collectively the access
price as they do not have strict incentives to set a higher access price. However, Valletti
and Cambini (2005) find that when firms can invest in the quality of their networks prior to
setting prices, firms have an incentive to choose an access charge larger than the termination
cost in order to reduce investment incentives. The reason is that their equilibrium profits
gross of the investment costs are equal to the Hotelling profits, because of the profit neutrality
result. Furthermore, they show that static efficiency is in conflict with dynamic efficiency
since firms under-invest in quality when access price is equal to the termination cost.
We considered a particular class of access pricing rules under which the mark-up of
the access price that network i pays to its rivals is a fraction of network i’s average retail
price mark-up. We first showed that all of the rules in the class lead to static efficiency (i.e.,
marginal cost pricing) while the profits vary depending on the degree with which the average
retail price mark-up influences the access price mark-up. Therefore, by properly choosing this
degree, the regulator can pursue additional objectives such as improving consumer surplus
or inducing full coverage. The most interest result is that the regulator can achieve both
static efficiency and dynamic efficiency at the same time. We also showed that the result
that the class of access pricing rules lead to static efficiency holds when networks compete in
menu of two-part tariffs. The general message of our paper is that creating the link between
access charge and retails prices provides extra instruments to promote competition and to
enhance efficiency.
References
Armstrong, M. “Network Interconnection.” Economic Journal, Vol. 108 (1998):
545-564.
Armstrong, M. “The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection.” in M. Cave,
S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang, eds., Handbook of Telecommunications Eco-
nomics, chap. 8, North Holland, 2002.
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers. “Competitive Price Discrimination”, Rand Jour-
nal of Economics, Vol. 32 (2001): 579-605.
Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (2001). Pricing Methodology
23
for the GSM Termination: Final Report.
Baumol, W. “Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Regulation,” International Journal
of Transport Economics Vol. 10 (1983): 341-355.
Baumol, W. and G. J. Sidak. “The Pricing of Inputs sold to Competitors,” Yale
Journal on Regulation, Vol. 11 (1994): 171-202.
Carter, M. and J. Wright. “Interconnection in Network Industries.” Review of
Industrial Organization, Vol. 14 (1999): 1-25.
Carter, M. and J. Wright. “Asymmetric Network Interconnection.” Review of
Industrial Organization, Vol. 22 (2003): 27-46.
Dessein, W. “Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing.” Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 34 (2003): 593-611.
Dessein, W. “Network Competition with Heterogeneous Customers and Calling
Patterns.” Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 16 (2004): 323-345.
Doganoglu, T. and Y. Tauman. “Network Competition and Access Charge
Rules.” The Manchester School, Vol. 70 (2002): 16-35.
Economides, N. and L.J. White. “Access and Interconnection Pricing: How
Efficient is the ”Efficient Component Pricing Rule”?” Antitrust Bulletin,
Vol. XL, (1995): 557-579.
Gans, J. S., and S. P. King. “Mobile Network Competition, Customer Ignorance
and Fixed-to-Mobile Call Prices.” Information Economics and Policy, Vol.
12 (2000): 301-327.
Gans, J. S., and S. P. King. “Using ‘Bill and Keep’ Interconnect Arrangements
to Soften Network Competition.” Economics Letters, Vol. 71 (2001): 413-420.
Ghosal, V. “Competition in International Postal Markets: Should the Universal
Postal Union’s Anti-remail Provisions Be Repealed?” World Competition Law
and Economics Review, Vol. 26 (2002): 205-222.
Hahn, J.-H. “Network Competition and Interconnection with Heterogeneous Sub-
scribers.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 22 (2004):
611-631.
Hermalin, B. and M. Katz. “Network Interconnection with Two-Sided User
Benefits.” Mimeo, UC Berkeley, 2001.
24
Hermalin, B. and M. Katz. “Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange
an Electronic Message?” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004): 423-
448.
Jeon, D.S. “A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome for
Interconnected Networks.” UPF Working Paper 808, 2005.
Jeon, D.S., J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole. “On the ”Receiver-Pays” Principle.” Rand
Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004), pp. 85-110.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Scott Marcus, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole. “Internet
Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle”, Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol. 34 (2003): 370-390.
Laffont, J.J., P. Rey and J. Tirole. “Network Competition I: Overview and
Nondiscriminatory Pricing.” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998a):
1-37.
Laffont, J.J., P. Rey and J. Tirole. “Network Competition II: Price Discrimina-
tion.” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998b): 38-56.
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole. Competition in Telecommunications, MIT, 2000.
Mialon, S. H. “Pricing Access in Network Competition.” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, Vol. 31 (2007): 109-123.
OECD. “Access pricing in telecommunications.”
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/6/27767944.pdf. Paris, 2004.
Rochet, J.C. and L.A. Stole. “Nonlinear Pricing with Randome Participation.”
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69 (2002): 277-311.
Salop, S. “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods.” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 10 (1979): 141-156.
Sibley, David S., Michael J. Doane, Michael A. Willams and Shu-Yi Tsai. “Pric-
ing Access To a Monopoly Input.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.
6 (2004) pp. 541-555.
Stennek, J. and T.P. Tanger˚as. “Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecom-
munications”, mimeo RIIE. 2006.
Valletti, Tommaso M. and Carlo Cambini. “Investments and Network Competi-
tion.” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 36 (2005): 446-467.
25
Willig, R. “The Theory of Network Access Pricing,” in Issues in Public Util-
ity Regulation, ed. by H. Trebing. Michigan State University Press, East
Lansing, MI. 1979.
Wright, J. “Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Net-
works.” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 50 (2002): 289-315.
26
